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Abstract—Future cellular networks are facing crucial archi-
tecture changes to cope with high throughput, energy and cost-
efficiency demands. Emerging solutions are small-cells and femto-
cells which will coexist with classical macro-cells technology. In
these heterogeneous networks, we study the joint service pricing
and bandwidth allocation problem at the operator level. Each
user selfishly adopts the service that optimizes its satisfaction. The
user-level problem is formulated as a general non-atomic game.
The Wardrop equilibrium is proven to exist and an analytical
expression is provided for arbitrary number of services. The
equilibria multiplicity, the influence of pricing and bandwidth
allocation policies are investigated numerically.
Index Terms—Small-cells, femto-cells, hierarchical games,
Wardrop equilibrium, Stackelberg equilibrium
I. INTRODUCTION
The constantly increasing demand for higher data rate
services motivates the development of new communication
standards and network architectures. Among the candidate
solutions for the next generation wireless networks are small-
cell [1] and femto-cells [2], [3] dedicated to outdoor and
indoor services respectively. Small-cells are short-range cells
densely deployed which enhance the throughput by increasing
the spectral reuse and decreasing the transmitter-receiver dis-
tance. Femto-cells are used for traffic offloading and indoor
coverage and can be connected to the network via DSL,
cable modems or orthogonal radio bandwidths. In such het-
erogeneous networks, several issues arise: what is the energy
and cost-efficient way in which the operator should deploy,
inter-connect, allocate resources among these networks (i.e.,
spectrum allocation, interference management), and price the
different types of provided services? Our objective, in this pa-
per, is to address some of these issues using game-theoretical
tools.
The most relevant related works are [4], [5], [6]. All
these works use the framework of hierarchical non-cooperative
games. In [4], the users’ dynamic subscription problem is
studied for a network where two competing operators chose
their own service price. At a lower level, the users can choose
among three options: adopt a service with a constant QoS,
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a service with a variable QoS (depending on the fraction
of users that adopt the same service), or do not adopt any
service. The Nash equilibrium of the duopoly competition
and the equilibrium in the non-atomic congestion game are
derived and analysed. In [6], the system is composed of
an operator providing two different services. The operator
objective is to choose the service prices in order to maximize
its revenue. The revenue at equilibrium point and the optimal
prices are analysed via numerical simulations. In [5], a three-
level hierarchical game is studied. At the higher level, the
operators decide which technology to adopt (among 3G, WiFi
and WiMax); at the intermediate level, the operators maximize
their revenues by choosing the prices for the provided services;
at the lower level, a congestion non-atomic game is analysed
where the users choose the service depending on their Quality
of Service and price.
The present paper can be seen as an extension of [6].
However, our contributions are significant and multi-fold :
(i) we rigorously define and study the two-level Stackelberg
formulation; (ii) we consider an arbitrary number of services,
prove the existence of the Wardrop equilibrium (WE) and
give its analytic expressions in the low-level non-atomic game;
(iii) we illustrate the existence of multiple WE via numerical
simulations; (iv) we consider the bandwidth allocation problem
among the two technologies: macro-cells and small-cells; (v)
throughput models and numerical simulations are provided
for three types of services: macro-cells only (M), macro-plus-
small-cells (MS) and macro-plus-small-plus-femtocells (MSF);
(vi) we analyse the influence of prices and bandwidth alloca-
tion policy on the network state; (vii) we provide analytical
expressions for the maximum service prices (s.t. beyond these
bounds, the service will not be adopted by any user). The
most general case, in which an arbitrary number of operators
provide each an arbitrary number of services is left as an
interesting extension of our work and [4].
This work is organized as follows. Our system model is
described in Sec. II. In Sec. III, we state our main result: the
existence of SE in the bi-level game. In Sec. IV, we focus
on the particular case where only three services are provided.
First, we model the throughputs, and, then, we illustrate, via
numerical simulations, the influence of pricing and bandwidth
allocation policy. We conclude in Sec. V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a heterogeneous wireless network where the
operator, i.e., the network owner, deploys a number of T ≥ 1
technologies, such as: Macro-Cells (MC), Small-Cells (SC)
and Femto-Cells (FC). The operator is assumed to provide
to its users a number of S ≥ 2 different services based on
these technologies. We assume an infinite number of users
N → +∞. These users are divided in an infinite number
of different classes [0, γmax] depending on their valuation or
satisfaction w.r.t. their experienced quality of service (QoS).
We define by Γ : [0, γmax] → [0, 1] the distribution function
of the population of users in function of these classes.
Notations: We denote by S = {1, . . . , S} the set of available
services. The vector (α, x) ∈ [0, 1]S+1 stands for the network
state, i.e., the vector of loads in the network such that:
• x ∈ [0, 1] is the fraction of the population that adopts
some service;
• αsx ∈ [0, 1] is the fraction of the population that adopts
service s ∈ S; α = (α1, . . . , αS) and
∑S
s=1 αs = 1.
At the operator level, the degrees of freedom are (p,β), where
p = (p1, . . . , pS) ∈ [0, P ]S is the vector of prices charged for
the provided services, and β ∈ B with
B =
{
(β1, . . . , βT ) ∈ [0, 1]T |
∑T
k=1 βk = 1
}
is the band-
width allocation policy vector among the deployed technolo-
gies assumed to be operating in orthogonal frequency bands.
III. JOINT PRICING AND BANDWIDTH ALLOCATION
PROBLEM IN A MULTI-TIER HETEROGENEOUS NETWORK
In this section, we analyse the joint pricing and bandwidth
allocation problem in a heterogeneous network as a bi-level
Stackelberg game [7]. The leader of the game, i.e., the system
operator, chooses the vector of service prices and the band-
width allocation policies, (p,β), to optimize its performance
criteria. Then, given the choice of the leader, the followers,
i.e., the customers, play a non-atomic non-cooperative game,
by selfishly choosing the service that optimizes their individual
satisfaction. The mutual interference that is created in the
system gives rise to an interactive situation among the selfish
users.
A. General non-atomic game
The low-level problem, the non-atomic game is defined by:
• The infinite population of players divided in classes
[0, γmax];
• The set of actions is the set S∗ = {0} ∪ S;
• The payoff functions {Uγs (·)}s∈S∗,γ∈[0,γmax], where, sim-
ilarly to [6], the payoff function of a user of class γ
obtained by adopting service s is given by:
Uγs (α, x,β,p) = γgs(α, x,β)− ps, (1)
where gs(α, x,β) represents the experienced QoS or
throughput when adopting service s and which depends
on the network state (α, x) and on the bandwidth allo-
cation vector β with g0 ≡ 0 and p0 = 0 (the benefit and
price for not adopting any service is zero).
The solution concept of a non-atomic game is the WE.
Intuitively, the WE is the equivalent of the Nash equilibrium in
a population game. It is a state of the network which is robust
to the deviation of an infinitesimal fraction of a population.
This concept has been introduced by Wardrop in the context
of transportation routing problems [8] and defined by the two
principles:
• The journey times in all routes actually used are equal
and less than those which would be experienced by a
single vehicle on any unused route.
• At equilibrium the average journey time is minimum.
We observe the analogy between the provided services, users,
payoff functions and routes, vehicles, journey times, respec-
tively.
Remark 3.1: The payoff obtained when connected to ser-
vice s depends on all the service loads in the system and not
only on the load in service s. Therefore, our framework is
more general than that of crowding games [9]. As we will see
in the next section, this consideration is crucial in the study
of co-existent technologies such as MC, SC and FC.
Our main result is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1: In the non-atomic game described above,
G = {[0, γmax],S∗, {Uγs }s∈S∗,γ∈[0,γmax]}, for fixed p ∈
[0, P ]S and β ∈ B, if the following two conditions are met:
[C1] the payoff functions {Uγs }s,γ depend only on the loads,
i.e., (α, x) ∈ [0, 1]S+1 and not on the users’ identities;
[C2] the functions gs(α, x,β) are continuous w.r.t. (α, x).
Then there exists at least one Wardrop equilibrium.
The proof follows from [C1], [C2] and applying Theorem 2
in [10] to our scenario.
Theorem 3.2: In the non-atomic game described in the
previous theorem, if the following condition is also satisfied:
[C3] there exists an ordering such as, ∀(α, x):
gr1(α, x,β) < gr2(α, x,β) < · · · < grS (α, x,β), .
Then the equilibrium points are solutions of the following
fixed-point system of equations:
αWEs = 0, ∀s ∈ S \ {c1, . . . , cQ}
γˆcj =
pcj−pcj−1
gcj (α
WE ,xWE ,β)−gcj−1 (αWE ,xWE ,β)
,
∀ j ∈ {1, . . . , Q}
xWE = 1− Γ(γˆc1)
αWEcj =
Γ(γˆcj+1 )−Γ(γˆcj )
xWE
, ∀ j ∈ {1, . . . , Q}
(2)
where 0 ≤ γˆc1 ≤ γˆc2 ≤ · · · ≤ γˆcQ ≤ γmax are thresholds
on the classes of users such that, at the WE all the users
of type γ ∈ (γˆck , γˆck+1 ] connect to service ck for all k ∈
{0, 1, . . . , Q}, with the convention that γˆc0 = 0 and γˆcQ+1 =
γmax. Depending on the prices p, only a subset of Q ≤ S
services, i.e. {c1, . . . , cQ}, will be adopted at the WE. This
subset is such that the two conditions are met simultaneously:
gc1(α, x,β) < · · · < gcQ(α, x,β) ∀(α, x)
pc1 ≤ · · · ≤ pcQ . (3)
Condition [C3] simply means that the operator guarantees
an experienced QoS for each service which is independent
on the system loads. For an intuitive insight, consider two
services si and sj such that psi ≥ psj and gsi(α, x,β) <
gsj (α, x,β), ∀ (α, x), i.e., service si is priced higher in
spite of the fact that it provides a lower throughput than sj . It
is obvious that service si will not be chosen by any rational
user (or payoff maximizer).
B. Optimal pricing and bandwidth allocation policies
At the higher level, the operator chooses the service prices
and optimal bandwidth allocation policy to optimize the mean
revenue per user given by:
max
p∈[0,P ]S ,β∈B
{
S∑
s=1
ps α
WE
s (p,β)x
WE(p,β)
}
(4)
Assuming that the operator is aware of the network state
at the WE, then it is able to choose the prices that maximize
its revenue. From theorem 3.1 we have the existence of at
least one WE for any pricing policy p ∈ [0, P ]M and any
bandwidth allocation policy in β ∈ B. We also have that
the feasible set (i.e., [0, P ]S
∏B) is a compact and convex
set. However, since multiple WE might exist for certain
values of (p,β) ∈ [0, P ]S∏B, we consider that the operator
chooses either the worst or the best equilibrium. These well-
defined optimization problems will be studied via numerical
simulations where the feasible set will be a finite quantization
of [0, P ]S
∏B ensuring that an optimal point (p∗,β∗) exists.
IV. SPECIFIC CASE: THREE AVAILABLE SERVICES
In this section, we consider a particular scenario where the
operator deploys three technologies MC, SC and FC. Based
on these technologies, the operator provides to its customers
three different services: macro-cell service M, macro-plus-
small-cells service MS and macro-plus-small-plus-femto-cells
service MSF.
A. Model of the throughput functions
The model for the throughput functions gs(·) is similar to
the one proposed in [6] for the MC and FC system. Here,
we extend this model by including the SC technology and
changing accordingly the services provided by the operator.
We assume that inside each MC we have both SC and FC but
in different areas.
The throughputs are defined as:
gM(α, x,β) = E[Tmc] (5)
gMS(α, x,β) = τscE[Tsc] + (1− τsc)E[Tmc]
gMSF(α, x,β) = τfcE[Tfc] + τscE[Tsc] + τmcE[Tmc]
where τfc, τsc, τmc are the expected fractions of time that
users spend indoors, in areas with small-cell coverage, and
in other areas respectively; E[Tfc], E[Tsc], E[Tmc] are the
downlink throughputs obtained when connected to a FC, SC
or MC respectively.
The following two assumptions are made:
Hypothesis 4.1: τmc < τsc < τfc
Hypothesis 4.2: E[Tmc] < E[Tsc] < E[Tfc]
ensuring that the throughputs gs(·) are ordered as:
gM(α, x,β) < gMS(α, x,β) < gMSF(α, x,β). (6)
The intuition behind Hypothesis 4.2 is the that MC sustain all
the users adopting services that employ also SC and FC in the
areas covered only by MC. Similarly, the SC sustain the users
that employ also FC in the areas covered by SC.
We further assume that, inside each MC, the users are
identically distributed over the available services as in the
whole network. Also, at a MC base station level, the arrivals
of individual user requests and the service times of these
requests are Poisson random processes. Then, the total packet
rate request at a MC base station is given by:
λmc = λx [αM + (1− τsc)αMS + (1− τsc − τfc)αMSF]Ncell,
where λxαMNcell is the rate of packet request from all users
inside the MC adopting service M; (1− τsc)λxαMSNcell is the
rate from users adopting service MS that are not SC coverage
area; (1−τsc−τfc)λxαMSFNcell is the rate from users adopting
service MSF that are neither indoors nor in SC coverage areas.
The rate at which the MC base station (BS) serves the
incoming packet requests is µmc = βmcRmcL where βmcRmc
is the achievable rate of the downlink channel (rate at which
the BS can send reliable information to all the users) and L
is the mean file length.
We assume that λmc < µmc and, denoting ρmc =
λmc/µmc, we have
Hypothesis 4.3: 0 < ρmc < 1.
Following a similar proof to the one in [6] and assuming
Hypothesis 4.4: lim
Ncell → ∞
µmc
λNcell
= cmc
where 0 < cmc <∞, we obtain:
E[Tmc] = βmcRmc [1− ρmc] − log(1− ρmc)
ρmc
. (7)
with ρmc =
[αM + (1− τsc)αMS + (1− τsc − τfc)αMSF]x
cmc
.
We proceed in a similar way to obtain the expected small-
cell throughput E[Tsc]. Here, the total service rate request at
a SC base station is:
λsc = τscλx(αMS + αMSF)
Ncell
Acell
(8)
where τscλxαMSNcell/Acell is the rate of packet request
from users adopting service MS that are inside the SC;
τscλxαMSFNcell/Acell is the rate request of users choosing MSF
service that are inside the SC. The term Acell denotes the
number of SC inside a MC.
The rate at which the SC base station (BS) serves the
incoming packet requests is µsc = βscRscL where βscRsc
denotes the rate at which the small-cell can send reliable
information to all the users. We assume that λsc < µsc, and
denoting ρsc = λscµsc , we have:
Hypothesis 4.5: 0 < ρsc < 1.
By considering:
Hypothesis 4.6: lim
Ncell → ∞
µscAcell
λNcell
= csc
where 0 < csc <∞ is a positive constant, we obtain:
E[Tsc] = βscRsc [1− ρsc] − log(1− ρsc)
ρsc
. (9)
with ρsc =
[1− αM]τscx
csc
.
For simplicity sake, we model the throughput obtained when
connecting to an indoor FC as being proportional to Rmc, i.e.,
E[Tfc] = κfcRmc.
To conclude, we normalize the throughput functions, the
prices and the operator revenue by Rmc and obtain:
gM(α, x,β)
Rmc
= βmcϕmc
gMS(α, x,β)
Rmc
= τscβsc
Rsc
Rmc
ϕsc + (1− τsc)βmcϕmc
gMSF(α, x,β)
Rmc
= τfcκfc + τscβsc
Rsc
Rmc
ϕsc + τmcβmcϕmc
where ϕmc = [1− ρmc] − log(1−ρmc)ρmc , ϕsc =
[1− ρsc] − log(1−ρsc)ρsc .
In order to ensure that Hypothesis 4.2 is met, we have
the following constraints on the system parameters: csc >
τsc/τmc, cmc > 1, βscRsc/Rmc < κfc.
Remark 4.1: All the aforementioned conditions and hypoth-
esis are required to guarantee a minimum experienced QoS
dictated by (6). This means that, in order to provide enhanced
services (e.g., MS, MSF), some resources must be allocated
to the new technologies SC, FC.
Given the above model of throughputs, all the conditions
in Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 are met therefore the existence of a
WE is ensured. The WE is given by (2).
B. Price upper-bounds
Depending on the system parameters, there exist cer-
tain maximum values for the service prices such that,
above these values, no user will adopt these services.
For service M, the maximum price is given by the so-
lution to the equation max
γ,ϕmc,α,x
[γgM(α, x,β)] − pM =
0 and is equal to pmaxM = γmaxβmc. The maxi-
mum prices for services MS and MSF follow similarly:
pmaxMS = γmax [τscβscRsc/Rmc + (1− τsc)βmc], pmaxMSF =
γmax
[
τfcκfc + τscβsc
Rsc
Rmc
+ τmcβmc
]
.
C. Numerical simulations
First, we consider the case of fixed bandwidth allocation,
i.e., βmc = 0.43, βsc = 0.4, βfc = 0.17. The following
scenario was investigated: γmax = 1, τmc = 0.15, τsc = 0.25,
τfc = 0.6, Rsc/Rmc = 1.79, κfc = 2. The price of service
MSF is fixed pMSF = 0.7. Using the upper-bounds in Subsec.
IV-B, the maximum prices are pmaxM = 0.43, p
max
MS = 0.5 and
pmaxMSF = 1.44.
Fig. 1 illustrates the operator revenue as a function of
pM ∈ {0, 0.1, · · · , 2} and pMS ∈ {0, 0.1, · · · , 2}. In order to
obtain the operator revenue, all the WE points were numeri-
cally computed by solving the system (2). It turns out that there
may exist several WE. In our plots, unless otherwise specified,
we always choose the point that yields the minimum operator
revenue (worst-case WE). The discontinuities in Fig. 1 are
explained by the multiplicity of the WE and by the values of
the upper-bounds pmaxM = 0.43, p
max
MS = 0.5. The fractions of
users that adopt service M, MS, MSF (αWEM x
WE , αWEMS x
WE ,
and αWEMSF x
WE) are plotted in Fig. 2, 3, 4 respectively. In these
figures, we observe that if pM ≥ pmaxM and pMS ≥ pmaxMS
then at the WE only service MSF will be used and the WE is
unique. Otherwise, there may be multiple WE and this explains
the irregularities in Fig. 2, 3. By tuning the prices, the operator
can manipulate the system loads at the WE.
Second, we no longer assume a fixed bandwidth allocation
policy but βmc ∈ {0.03, 0.08, 0.13 · · · , 0.73}, βfc = 0.17,
βsc = 1−βmc−βfc.1 The following scenario was considered:
γmax = 1, τmc = 0.15, τsc = 0.25, τfc = 0.6, Rsc/Rmc =
12.17, κfc = 11.
In Fig. 5, we plot the operator revenues at the worst and
best WE as function of βmc for the prices pM = 0.5, pMS = 2.0
and pMSF = 4.2. We observed that, in this scenario, at the best
WE: αWEMSF = 1 (only service MSF is used). Here, the operator
revenue is decreasing w.r.t. βmc because of Hypothesys 4.2. If
βmc ≤ 0.18, at the worst WE: αWEMS = 1 (only service MS is
used) and increasing βmc will decrease the operator revenue.
If βmc ≥ 0.53, at the worst WE: αWEM = 1 (only service
M is used) and and increasing βmc will increase the operator
revenue. If 0.18 < βmc < 0.53, the WE is unique and the
two curves are superimposed. We observe that the operator
can manipulate the equilibrium system loads by tuning the
bandwidth allocation policy.
In Fig. 6, we plot the revenue at the optimum prices
and both, the worst and best WE (taken for each com-
bination of prices), as functions of βmc. The ranges of
prices over which the optimal values were computed are:
pM ∈ {0, 0.1, 0.2, · · · , 1}, pMS ∈ {0, 0.2, 0.4, · · · , 3} and
pMSF ∈ {0, 0.2, 0.4, · · · , 9}. The optimal revenue in both cases
is decreasing when the fraction of MC bandwidth is increased.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied a multi-tier network where an operator
deploys heterogeneous technologies (e.g., composed of macro-
cells, small-cells and femto-cells). Based on these technolo-
gies, the operator can provide to its customers several types of
services. We have formalized the joint pricing and bandwidth
allocation problem as a Stackelberg game. We have analysed
the solution of the corresponding game, both, mathematically
and via numerical simulations. We have observed that, in
order to provide enhanced services at higher prices, some
minimal network resources (e.g., bandwidth) must be allocated
to the small-cells and femto-cells. Furthermore, by tuning the
pricing and the bandwidth allocation policy, the operator can
manipulate the system loads at the equilibrium operating point.
1The range of values of βmc is such that Hypothesis 4.2 is met (see Remark
4.1).
Fig. 1. Operator revenue at the worst WE vs. prices pM and pMS for the scenario:
pMSF = 0.7, (βmc, βsc, βfc) = (0.43, 0.40, 0.17).
Fig. 2. Fraction of users that adopt service sM: αMx, for pMSF = 0.7 γmax = 1,
(βmc, βsc, βfc) = (0.43, 0.40, 0.17).
REFERENCES
[1] J. Hoydis, M. Kobayashi, and M. Debbah, “Green small cell networks,”
IEEE Veh. Technol. Mag., vol. 6, pp. 37–43, Mar. 2011.
[2] V. Chandrasekhar, J. G. Andrews, and A. Gatherer, “Femtocell networks:
A survey,” IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 46, no. 9, pp. 59–67, Sept. 2008.
[3] S. Al-Rubaye, A. Al-Dulaimi, and J. Cosmas, “Cognitive femtocell,”
IEEE Veh. Technol. Mag., vol. 6, pp. 44–51, Mar. 2011.
[4] S. Ren, J. Park, and M. van der Schaar, “Users subscription, revenue
maximization, and competition in communications markets,” in Proc.
IEEE INFOCOM, Shanghai, China, Apr. 2011, pp. 1–9.
[5] P. Maill, B. Tuffin, and J.-M. Vigne., “Economics of technological
Fig. 3. Fraction of users that adopt service sMS: αMSx, for pMSF = 0.7,
(βmc, βsc, βfc) = (0.43, 0.40, 0.17).
Fig. 4. Fraction of users that adopt service sMSF: αMSFx, for pMSF = 0.7,
(βmc, βsc, βfc) = (0.43, 0.40, 0.17).
Fig. 5. Operator revenue at the worst and best WE vs. MC bandwidth βmc for
βfc = 0.17, pM = 0.5, pMS = 2.0 and pMSF = 4.2.
games among telecommunication service providers,” Proc. of IEEE
GLOBECOM, 2010.
[6] N. Shetty, S. Parekh, and J. Walrand, “Economics of femtocells,” in
Proc. of IEEE GLOBECOM, Hawaii, USA, Nov. 2009.
[7] H. von Stackelberg, The theory of the market economy. Oxford,
England: Oxford Univ. Press, 1952.
[8] J. G. Wardrop, “Some theoretical aspects of road traffic research,” Proc.
of Institute of Civil Engineers, Part II, 1952.
[9] I. Milchtaich, “Generic uniqueness of equilibrium in large crowding
games,” Department of Economics, Bar–Ilan University, Feb. 2000.
[10] D. Schmeidler, “Equilibrium points of nonatomic games,” Journal of
Stat. Phys., vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 295–300, 1973.
Fig. 6. Optimal operator revenue w.r.t. pricing at the worst and best WE vs. MC
bandwidth βmc for βfc = 0.17.
